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This paper explores the dynamics of support for the UK’s departure from the EU over the 
course of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017. It further identifies groups with a particular profile 
in terms of political attitudes and behaviours and explores whether these groups show a 
marked change in their support for leave. The paper draws on two contrasting perspectives on 
voter volatility. While the first one considers the phenomenon to be a characteristic of 
whimsical, uninterested and disengaged people, the second one sees it in a more positive light 
as it associates volatility with the informed and emancipate citizen holding politicians to 
account. The study uses Waves 6, 7 and 8 of Understanding Society and conducts various 
analyses, including latent class analysis (LCA), to explore the research questions. LCA yields 
four groups with distinct political profiles. Only one of these groups, labelled “the highly 
engaged and satisfied”, shows a significant increase in support for leave. The other groups, 
including “the non-engaged” and “the dissatisfied”, are not becoming significantly more or 





















Based on the result of the EU referendum, held on the 23rd of June 2016, the British 
government decided that the United Kingdom should leave the European Union. As the 
majority in favour of Leave was so small (52% versus 48% preferring Britain to stay in the 
EU), one can legitimately ask whether the same result would be obtained if the plebiscite were 
held again. Particularly if it were demonstrated that voters change their opinion easily on this 
matter, the chance of a different outcome in a second vote would be quite large. If opinions 
indeed turn out to be fluctuating, it can be questioned how wise it was to base such a 
momentous decision on a single poll with such a small difference between supporters and 
opponents of Britain’s continued membership of the EU. 
 
For this reason the first objective of this study is to assess how volatile the opinions of the 
British electorate are on Britain’s membership of the EU. Understanding Society data collected 
both before and after the referendum will be used for this purpose. There is some reason to 
believe that support for leaving the EU was not stable and has in fact declined after the 
referendum. The British Election Study Team (2016), for instance, found that 6 % of the people 
who voted leave regretted their decision compared to 1% of the people who voted remain. 
Referendum results abroad confirm the impression that voter preferences are not stable on 
issues to do with Europe. For instance, while the Irish electorate voted the Treaty of Lisbon 
down with a margin of 53.4% to 46.6% (with a turnout of 53%) in a referendum held on 12 
June 2008, only one year later, in a second referendum on 2 October 2009, they approved it by 
67.1% to 32.9% (with a turnout of 59%). Of course, in between these time points Ireland was 
hit particularly hard by the financial crisis, but even so the difference in results between the 
first and the second referendum is conspicuous.  
 
Our second objective is to explore whether there are distinct groups showing a marked change 
in the preference for Leave as this can help us identify the possible causes of voter fluctuations. 
To inform our analyses for this objective we will draw on the literature on voter volatility. As 
the next section explains, there are two contrasting perspectives on this phenomenon, with one 
interpreting it as a threat to the stability of western democracies while another evaluates it more 
positively. Our analysis will engage with these perspectives. Analytically, we will address this 
objective in three ways. First, we describe changes in support for leave before and after the 
referendum for groups differing by education, income, age and gender. Second, we assess 
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whether the influence of these socio-demographic conditions is also significantly different 
between the respondents surveyed before and those surveyed after the referendum. This 
analysis will also include attitudinal factors concerning, for instance, satisfaction with income, 
political engagement, political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and national identity. It is 
worthwhile to examine attitudes as Kaufmann (2016) found party preference and attitudes 
towards immigration, European integration and the death penalty to be particularly strong 
determinants. Thirdly, we conduct a latent class analysis to see whether particular groups of 
respondents can be identified combining political attitudes and behaviours with a preference 
for Leave or Remain. We will also assess whether some of these groups show more fluctuating 
support for either of these options comparing the pre- to the post-referendum group.  
 
There is a rapidly expanding literature on the determinants of the preference for Leave and 
some studies have also sought to identify distinct voter profiles. An example of the latter is the 
Natcen report seeking to offer explanations for the Leave vote. This study identified “affluent 
Eurosceptics”, “older working classes” and “economically deprived, anti- immigrant” as 
groups showing a marked preference for leave, and “middle class liberals” and “younger 
working class labour voters” as groups with a very pronounced and moderate preference for 
remain, respectively (Swales 2016: 25). However, to our knowledge so far no study examined 















2. Literature Review on Voter Volatility  
There is good reason to pose the question of voter instability as electoral volatility has been 
found to be generally increasing in western democracies (Drummond, 2006). More and more 
voters switch their support from one party to another between and during elections (van de 
Meer et al, 2013). Traditional theories, based on the cross-country study of electoral systems, 
suggest that this is due to a general weakening of party allegiance amongst voters (Leach et al, 
2011); an increase in the number of political parties in many countries (Pedersen, 1979; 
Dejaeghere and Dassonneville, 2012); and to a related decrease in the ideological 
differentiation between parties (Pedersen, 1979). Different electoral systems are said to vary in 
their levels of electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979) - with comparative studies showing both 
more (Dejaeghere and Dassonneville, 2012) and less (Pedersen, 1979) switching in more 
proportional electoral systems - but the trend is said to be common to many countries and 
electoral systems. In the United Kingdom there has been an increase in the number of smaller 
parties seriously contesting elections, as well as a long-term decline in support for the two main 
political parties. Support for the Labour and Conservative parties combined declined in 
elections, from 97% in 1951 to 72% in 1983, 74% in 1997 and 65% in 2010 (Leach et al 2011). 
While the average election swing over the long duration has been at around 3%, some more 
recent elections have seen exceptional swings, with a 10% swing from Conservative to Labour 
in 1997 and a 5% swing from Labour to Conservative in the 2010 election. 
 
Scholars have evaluated this increasing volatility very differently. Some believe it has led to 
ineffective government, short term policies and populism as politicians need to respond 
constantly and immediately to capricious voters.  They tend to portray volatile voters as 
uninterested and uninformed people responding to fads and being absorbed by their own 
interests (Walgrave et al 2010; Andeweg 1982). We label this as the pessimistic perspective. 
Others have a more positive take on the phenomenon. They see the changeable voter as an 
informed and engaged person willing to vote a government out of office if this government is 
seen as ineffective or not delivering on promises. Democracy, in their view, needs these critical 
emancipated citizens to remain responsive to its electorate and not degenerate into a sclerotic 
political system serving only the elites (Dalton 1984; 2004; van de Meer et al 2013). It has also 
been argued that people alternating between voting and non-voting need not be a cause of 
concern as these voters mainly represent critical “stand-by” citizens, i.e. people who only see 
the need to become engaged and participate in politics if they are dissatisfied about the 
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performance of the government (Amna and Ekman 2013). We call this the optimistic 
perspective. 
 
Studies focussing on the characteristics associated with voter switching do not unequivocally 
support one or the other perspective.  In an early account based on a study of a US Presidential  
election, Berelson et al (1963) argued that stability in voting patterns was ‘characteristic of 
those interested in politics and instability of those not particularly interested’ (p. 20). In a later 
comparative study of election survey data for 32 elections in different countries between 2000 
and 2010, Dejaeghere and Dassonneville (2012) concluded that more knowledgeable voters 
tended to switch parties less often than less sophisticated voters (although, perhaps 
paradoxically, more educated voters switched more often). They also found that satisfaction 
with democracy and high levels of ‘external political efficacy’ suppress voter switching. These 
studies thus broadly support the pessimistic perspective. However, a recent study of voter 
volatility between 2006 and 2010 in the Netherlands (van de Meer et al, 2013) did not find a 
relationship between voter switching and lack of interest in politics, nor that voter switching 
was particularly prevalent amongst either the more or less educated. According to this study, 
voter volatility in the Netherlands occurs within wide layers of the electorate, with older voters 
and those with average levels of education and income being more volatile than other groups. 
Their findings suggest that most switching was between similar parties, with the less educated 
being the most likely to switch between dissimilar parties. Their study suggests greater support 
for the optimistic perspective as the authors concluded that “volatility reflects voter 
emancipation rather than disengagement” (ibid p 100). 
 
Given the short time that has elapsed since the June 2016 referendum in the UK, there is 
inevitably rather little literature on which to draw a study of changing support for the UK 
leaving or remaining in the European Union. There are however, some studies of longer term 
changes of attitudes towards the EU amongst people in the UK, as well as a few recent studies 
which look at the effects of the referendum campaign on support for Leave and Remain. 
 
In their recent study of ‘Why Britain voted to leave the European Union’, Clarke, Goodwin 
and Whiteley (2017) trace attitudes towards the EU back to 2004 and remind us how volatile 
popular opinion has been on this subject. Using the monthly ECMS surveys which asked 
respondents if they approved of Britain’s membership of the EU, Clarke et al found that over 
12 years an average of 44.7% approved and 42.9 % disapproved. However, there were 
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considerable fluctuations in the UK population’s attitudes towards the EU. Approval varied 
from a low of 34.7% in June 2011 to a high of 52.3% in June 2005. Disapproval varied from 
of low of 34.4% in March 2005 to a high of 53.5% in June 2011 (p.65).  
 
In their analysis of the factors affecting these fluctuations the authors are skeptical about 
explanations based on changes in perceptions of national identity, which they maintain are 
relatively stable. Instead they base their explanations on the ‘valence theory’ advanced by 
Butler and Stokes in 1969 which contends that voting is primarily determined by how well 
voters believe different parties deliver on the policy issues on which there is a broad consensus 
about desirable outcomes. The authors therefore argue that support for the EU is to a large 
degree dependent on perceptions of the effectiveness of the EU in delivering the objectives that 
people agree are desirable – such as prosperity, security and value for money. The second 
‘valence’ issue, they say, relates to Government effectiveness in controlling immigration. Thus 
people are more supportive of the EU when the UK economy is doing well and less supportive 
when it is floundering and when immigration is seen to be out of control. On this account the 
increase in anti-EU attitudes after 2011 is best explained by a widespread belief that the 
Eurozone was experiencing multiple crises which it was not managing well, including in 
relation to debt, security and refugees, and that the UK Government was failing to control 
immigration.  Valence Theory could be considered to be one of the ‘Optimistic Perspectives’.  
Valence theory presupposes informed and critical voters holding the government to account 
and also believing that changing their vote makes sense. We will investigate whether groups 
of people with such a profile can be identified and whether they are indeed more inclined to 
change voting preferences than other groups. This is the contribution of this paper to the 
literature. 
 
Nevertheless, at the outset of the EU referendum campaign support for Leave and Remain 
appeared to be relatively evenly balanced. What is of most relevant, therefore, for this analysis 
of changes in patterns of support between January 2016 and January 2017, is what happened 
during and after the referendum campaign. The research literature on this is inevitably still 
quite limited, but the report from NatCen on ‘Understanding the Leave Vote’ (Swales, 2017), 
provides a useful starting point. Their analysis notes that repeated British Social Attitude 
surveys between 1992 and 2016 show a long-term increase in Euroscepticism, rising from 10% 
in 1992 to 28% in 2015 on their chosen measure, with the sharpest increase after the 2008 
financial crisis.  But they also note that there was a tipping point after May 2016. Their main 
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explanation lies with the effects of the referendum campaign itself. Voters, they argue, were 
not convinced by the economic case against leaving the EU put forward by the Remain 
campaign and this led to a clear softening of support for Remain during the campaign. The 
Leave campaign, on the other hand, increased its support by building a wider coalition of voters 































3.  Data, variables and methods 
 
Data 
The data used in this study are from Waves 6 (2014), 7 (2015) and 8 (2016 and 2017) of the 
UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). This dataset includes the subsamples collected 
during the first year of each wave and comprises half of the Understanding Society general 
population sample, the BHPS sample and the Northern Ireland sample. The total across the 
three waves is 19845 cases, for whom information on the EU membership referendum is 
available. The EU membership question was asked in Wave 8, and we made use of the previous 
two waves in order to gather information on theoretically relevant predictors such as income, 
voting behaviour, political efficacy and trust in UK institutions. It is important to highlight that 
the membership question was asked throughout 2016 and the first quarter of 2017. This enables 
us to compare respondents interviewed before and after the referendum of the 23rd of June and 
thus assess whether these groups show a difference in their support for leave. We note that 
these groups do not concern the same respondents, as the respondents participating in Wave 8 
were interviewed only once in 2016 or 2017. This has consequences for exploring the dynamics 
of support over this period as it means that we cannot assess changes for individual 
respondents. All we can do is identify changes in the aggregate for different groups in the 
population. To do this, we will analyse repeated cross-sections of the sample (by quarter of 
interview), which is an accepted practice provided the cross-sections are representative (UK 
Data Service 2015: 5).  With regards to Understanding Society, the cross-sections by quarter 
of interview over the 2016 – 2017 period can be made nationally representative by applying 
the June 23rd pre-post weight (Lynn 2017), which we have consequently done for the 
subsequent analyses. This also means the cut-off point for the second quarter will be the 23rd 
of June. Thus, in the analyses below first and second quarter of 2016 represent those 
interviewed before the referendum, and third and later quarters those surveyed after the 
referendum. Again, whenever we talk about “growing” or “declining” support for Leave further 
below, we mean aggregate change, not change for individuals.  
 
Variables 





Table 1. Outcome variable 
Should the UK remain a member of the EU? 
 n % 
Remain 10,660 53.72 
Leave 7,999 40.31 
Don't know 1,186 5.98 
Total 19,845 100 
 
Regarding the independent variables, we are interested in the links of both observed socio-
demographic characteristics and political attitudes and behaviour to opinions on Britain’s 
membership of the EU. To represent the former we included gender, age, education, income, 
employment status and marital status in the analyses below. Many studies have found these 
‘usual suspects’ to be strongly linked to a preference for leave or remain (Carke and Whittaker 
2016; Kaufmann 2016; Swales 2016). Attitudinal and behavioural indicators concern variables 
tapping voting behaviour (voted at the last general election in 2015; party voted for), support 
for a particular party, intention to vote at the next GE, interest in politics, political efficacy and 
political engagement. We also include variables on trust in institutions and national identity. 
Appendix A gives a complete account of all these variables, including the full wording of the 
questions on which they are based.  
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the attitudinal variables and shows their response rates. It also 
includes separate variables for the ‘don’t know’ categories. We consider it important to include 
these in the analysis aiming to identify groups with particular characteristics (see further below) 













Table 2. Indicators used to define Voter profiles 




Uncertain answer (Don't 




1 Didn't vote last GE 21.2   
2 Doesn't support Party 68.5   
3 No strong support for Party 57.4   
4 Voted Conservative 27.4   
5 Voted labour 26   
6 Voted Lib Dem 7   
7 Voted SNP 4.5   
8 Voted UKIP 6.2   
9 Voted Green Party 2.8   
10 Voted Other 26.2   
11 Intend to vote next GE 77.3   
12 No interest in politics 52.6   
13 Vote is civic duty 78.5 DK vote civic duty 14.6 
14 Yes own political influence 18.6 DK own political influence 6.8 
15 Political engagement is costly 55.4 DK costs political engagement 35.9 
16 Dissatisfied with democracy 51.3 DK satisfied democracy 6.8 
17 Not qualified for politics 60 DK if qualified  25.3 
18 Not better informed 68.8 DK better informed 33.3 
19 Public officials care 30.6 DK public officials care 29.7 
20 Have a say in politics 35 DK if have a say in politics 23.7 
21 Importance of being British 71.4   
 
Methods  
We start by providing mean levels of support for leave by quarter of interview to describe 
trends in the outcome of interest. Subsequently, we explore the predictors of the preference for 
leave with logistic regression because of the binary nature of the dependent variable. We do 
this primarily to assess whether any identified change in support for Leave is genuine. This is 
important as a robustness check as we rely on repeated cross-sections by quarter, as explained 
earlier. These quarterly samples could show small differences in socio-demographic 
composition. If aggregate levels of support are entirely a reflection of these differences, no real 
change in this support has occurred. To assess whether the predictors became stronger or 
weaker over time we include interaction terms combining quarter of interview with each of 
these predictors.  
 
Third, we use latent class analysis (LCA) (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Lazarsfeld, 1959) to identify 
subgroups in the population based on their political attitudes and behaviours. The first step of 
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the LCA is the selection of the number of classes, or sub-groups, that best describe the 
qualitative differences in the conditional distributions of the indicators in the population under 
analysis. LCA helps identify subgroups whose respective members are internally 
homogeneous, whilst also maximising the between-group heterogeneity on the basis of the 
chosen indicators, using as the starting point the responses to a set of categorical questionnaire 
items (Geiser, 2013). The analyses were conducted in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998) and 
Stata v15.  
 
There is a set of model fit statistics that we took into account in order to select the optimal 
number of latent classes, i.e., the log-likelihood value (LL), the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), the sample-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (s-BIC). For the first index (the 
LL), the higher the value the better the solution, whilst the opposite is true for the AIC and s-
BIC. The other result to consider is the Entropy measure, which is an indicator of the quality 
of the classification: in this case, values above .800 are desirable (Muthén and Muthén, 2007). 
Finally, search for the optimal solution is guided by the adjusted Lo-Mendel-Rubin likelihood 
ratio test (Adjusted LRT) and its p-value, as well for the bootstrapped LRT (BLRT), both of 
which compare the appropriateness of the last estimated model with k classes with the previous 
one with k-1 classes (Finch & Bronk, 2011; Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). The other 
result to consider is the Entropy measure, which is an indicator of the quality of the 
classification: in this case, values above .800 are desirable (Muthén & Muthén, 2007). 
 
Once the subgroups in the population are identified by the latent classes, the second step is the 
characterisation, or description of the classes based on the probability of membership in each 
class, as well as the conditional item response probability within each class (Collins & Lanza, 
2010). The conditional response probability is the probability of a score of 1 (the maximum) 
on a specific item, given the individual’s membership in one of the detected classes. 
 
Lastly, we use multinomial regression to assess how the latent classes that we identified are 
related to opinions on the UK’s membership of the EU. We use this type of analysis as we are 
also interested in the undecided respondents and the outcome variable thus has three categories 
(leave, remain and don’t know). We run both a model with the latent profiles as the sole 
explanatory variable (i.e. the baseline model) and a model with the latent profiles and various 
socio-demographic characteristics as predictors. 
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We use the weight recommended by the Understanding Society team for all these analyses (i.e. 
brextotwt).  Applying these weights ensures that the proportions in the sample on a given set 


































Trends in support for leave 
Figures 1-5 display the development of the preference for leave from the first quarter of 2016 
to the first quarter of 2017. Support for Brexit appears to have first risen, from 41.7% in the 
first quarter of 2016 to 46.5% in the last quarter of 2016, and then slightly declined, to 45.8% 
in first quarter of 2017, across the sample as a whole (Figure 1). Noticeable is the sharp increase 
from the second to the third quarter, which suggests that the EU referendum itself has had an 
impact on the preference for leave. Possibly, people adapted their opinions to the new Brexit 
reality after the referendum. The sample is further likely to have underestimated the preference 
for leave among the population because the result of the EU referendum, as we all know, was 
52% in favour of Brexit. Thus, even with all the proper weights in place the Understanding 
Society data is still likely to have underrepresented some groups in the population (notably 
those inclined to vote leave). We feel the reader needs to be made aware of this caveat. 
 
Figure 1. The dynamics of support for Britain’s departure from the EU (%) 
 
 
Figures 2-5 show the trends by different subgroups. To begin with age, we see that the common 
arch-shaped trend (of an initial rise and a subsequent decline) is visible in each age group, 
except for the youngest group. This group shows a more fluctuating pattern, which is perhaps 























in levels of support for leave between the age groups, with the Millennials showing much less 
enthusiasm for this idea than the elderly. This is a well-known finding highlighted by previous 
studies. Much the same observations can be made for different income groups (Figure 3). All 
income groups, except for the 4th quintile, show a steady rise and then a slight falloff and do so 
at practically the same rate of increase and decline. Again it is differences in levels rather than 
trends that catch the eye. This time it is the lower income groups showing much greater support 
for leave, with support decreasing linearly as income increases.  
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Figure 3. Trends in support for leave by income group (%) 
 
 
Patterns are a bit different for gender and education. Although men and women show the same 
arch-shaped trend, they do converge in their support for leave (Figure 4). While men started 
out with a 4% lead over women in their support for Brexit, towards the end of the time series 
this had shrunk to just 1%. Women seem to have been particularly responsive to the EU 
referendum as their preference for Leave rose markedly from 39% to 46% between quarters 
two and three. With regard to education (as measured by highest qualification obtained), the 
very pronounced difference in levels of support for leave between those with the lowest (60%) 
and those with the highest levels of education (24%) is the first thing to be noticed. It is also 
interesting to observe that these polar opposites are very stable in their support for Brexit 
throughout 2016. By contrast, the groups with middling education levels show either dramatic 
fluctuations or a steep rise in the preference for leave. Moreover, opinions on Brexit appear to 
have become more polarized across education groups as those with GCSEs or A-levels, as the 
education groups closest to those with the lowest level of education, are approaching the latter 
in their support for leave, while those with qualifications just under degree level have moved 
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Figure 4. Trends in support for leave by gender (%) 
 
 











































No qualifications GCSE A-levels Other degrees Degree
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Predictors of the preference for Brexit 
Also when controlling for socio-demographic and attitudinal features, support for leaving the 
EU appears to have risen significantly during 2016 (see Table 3 below). We thus know that 
this change is genuine and does not reflect differences across time in the social composition of 
the sample. The coefficients in the table representing the different quarters show the same 
inverse u-shaped trend over time as was observed above. Compared to individuals responding 
in the first quarter of 2016, those responding in the second quarter are 1.5 percent more likely 
to support ‘leave’ (non-significant difference), and those responding in the third quarter are 3.7 
per cent more likely to support ‘leave’. The support for ‘leave’ reaches a peak in the fourth 
quarter with a 5.6 percent difference, then declines in the first quarter of 2017 (4 percent 
difference). The trend is probably showing a relationship with the internsification of the ‘leave’ 
campaign but we cannot state this with certainty. Assuming that the referendum campaign 
intensified from the second quarter, the results seem to show that the leave campaign struck a 



























Quarter of interview   
   First quarter 2016 (ref cat)   
   Second quarter 2016 (until 23 June) 0.014 0.016 
   Third quarter 2016 (from 24 June) 0.037* 0.015 
   Fourth quarter 2016 0.056*** 0.017 
   First quarter 2017 0.039~ 0.022 
Age  0.001* 0.001 
Female -0.067*** 0.011 
Marital status   
   Single (ref cat)   
   Married 0.054** 0.018 
   Divorced 0.067** 0.023 
   Widowed -0.025 0.026 
Employment status   
   Employed (ref cat)   
   Not employed -0.016 0.026 
   Retired 0.009 0.017 
   Looking after family 0.047 0.030 
   Student -0.058 0.039 
Household income -0.004** 0.001 
Satisfaction with income -0.014*** 0.004 
Highest qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) -0.050*** 0.004 
Importance of being British 0.027*** 0.002 
Level of interest in politics -0.025*** 0.007 
Qualified to participate in politics -0.017** 0.006 
Do not have a say on what govt does 0.028*** 0.006 
Satisfaction with democracy in own country -0.036*** 0.007 
Public officials do not care 0.039*** 0.007 
Observations 10896  
Standard errors in parentheses   
~ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001   
 
Note: HH income is measured in units of £500 
 
The regression analysis confirms previous research regarding the negative correlation between 
socio-economic status and support for leave. More educated individuals, individuals from 
families with a a higher income and individuals who are more satisfied with their income are 
less likely to support ‘leave’. In detail, moving from no qualification to GCSE or from GCSE 
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to A level or from A level to a degree on average decreases the likelihood of supporting ‘leave’ 
by 5 percent. An increase of the gross monthly income of 500£ decreases the support for ‘leave’ 
by 0.4 percent. A higher satisfaction with income is also associated with a lower probability  
of supporting ‘leave’.  
 
Attitudinal factors can be distinguished in british identity, political efficacy and trust in politics. 
Individuals for whom being British is very important are more likely to support ‘leave’, as well 
as those showing little interest in politics, not considering themselves qualified to participate 
in politics, feeling excluded from politics (“do not have say in what government does”), and 
being dissatisfied with democracy in one’s country. British identity plays a large role in shaping 
the support for leave, but also the feeling of being excluded from politics and disentchantment 
with democracy led individuals to take the leave gamble. Even if the leave option is likely to 
be costly in the long term, many leave supporters seem to be willing to pay the price in order 
to challenge the status quo.  
 
Figure 6. The interaction of importance of feeling British with quarter of interview 
 
 
We interacted quarter of interview with the all predictors to analyse whether the effect of these 
predictors follow a time trend. Britishness turned out to be the only variable whose effect 
changed as shown by the significant interaction with time (for the complete results of this 
analysis, see Appendix B further down). Britishness became a more important positive 
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determinant of support for leave over the course of 2016 (see Figure 6). Possibly, people with 
a strong British identity were not engaged with the issue yet at the start of 2016 and only 
became more involved when the leave campaign gathered steam.  
 
Identifying different political profiles of respondents 
We provide the results of the latent class analysis in terms of the selection of the appropriate 
number of classes in Table 4 and Figure 7. The Entropy value is below .800 for every solution, 
but the graphical representation of the LL, AIC, BIC values would suggest that the optimal 
solutions are the 3-class and the 4-class. Hence we proceed to describe these solutions, however 
due to the higher level of detail we decided to retain the four-class solution for the analysis of 
change in support for the EU Referendum outcomes. 
 














p-value for K-1 
classes 
2 -204405.771 59 408929.541 409207.877 0.741 0.0000 
3 -200341.4320 89 400860.8650 401280.7270 0.747 0.0000 
4 -198083.8980 119 396405.7960 396967.1850 0.738 0.0000 
5 -196287.5570 149 392873.1140 393576.0300 0.735 0.0000 
6 -194974.0880 179 390306.1760 391150.6180 0.736 0.0000 
 

























Figures 8 and 9 below report the response probabilities for the 3- and the 4-class solutions, 
respectively.  
 
For the 3-class solution we identified the following groups (the labelling is ours):  
 
The non-engaged: 24.9%. These people are characterised by low support for conventional 
political participation; if they vote at all, they avoid the major parties. Voting in general is not 
their way to express their political engagement. They are not interested in politics and do not 
think that voting is a civic duty. Their sense of political efficacy is the lowest of all groups, 
they are undecided or dissatisfied about democracy, and they do not feel qualified to participate 
in the political arena. They are also distrusting of public officials, and record the lowest level 
of Britishness 
 
The highly engaged: 37.5%. This group shows high levels of voting and support for a particular 
party (mostly one of the major parties). They have a definite intention to vote in the next GE 
and are highly interested in politics. They also strongly believe that voting is a civic duty, have 
high levels of political efficacy and believe that political engagement is not costly. They are 
satisfied with democracy and consider themselves qualified for politics and better informed 
than the average citizen. They express high levels of trust in public officials and attach great 
value to their British identity. 
 
The unsure voters: 37.6%. These respondents believe in voting as a civic duty, and tend to vote 
for the major parties, as well as for UKIP, although they do not support any party strongly. 
They do not show a high interest in politics, have moderately high levels of political efficacy, 
but say that they are not better informed about politics than the average citizen. They do not 
feel qualified to participate in politics, do not trust public officials, and do not think they have 
a say in politics but think that feeling British is important. 
 
When looking at the 4-class solution, the fourth class seems to originate from the highly 
engaged and the unsure voters in the 3c solution. The following groups emerge: 
 
The trusting voters: 20.5%. These people tended to vote at the last general election. Although 
they do not provide particularly strong support for any political party, they are the most likely 
to have voted for the Tories at the last GE. They think that voting is a civic duty, but are 
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undecided as to whether political participation is costly. They are satisfied with democracy, but 
do not know if they are qualified enough for politics. They have relatively high trust in public 
officials, think that they have a say in politics and consider their British identity to be very 
important. 
 
The highly engaged and satisfied: 30.3%. This group shows high support for party politics, as 
they both go to the ballot box and support a political party, mostly one of the major parties. 
They express a definite intention to vote in the next GE, are highly interested in politics, and 
strongly believe that voting is a civic duty. They feel they really have a say in government 
policy and believe that political engagement is not costly. They are satisfied with democracy, 
consider themselves qualified for politics and better informed than the average citizen. They 
express high levels of trust in public officials, and assign great importance to their Britishness. 
 
The non-engaged: 24.4%. This group is very similar to the non-engaged group in the three-
class solution. They also consider voting not to be a civic duty but appear to be more likely 
than any other class to say that they are not qualified for politics.  
 
The dissatisfied voters: 21.8%. This group voted for UKIP in the highest numbers and 
expresses relatively low levels of trust in public officials. They show a very low score on 
political efficacy.
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Non-engaged Highly engaged and satisfied Unsure voters
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Trusting voters Highly engaged and satisfied Non-engaged Dissatisfied voters
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The link between political profiles and support for leave 
In the final step we included the profiles generated by the 4-class LCA and a number of socio-
demographic variables in a model to explain the disposition toward the UK’s membership in 
the EU. Moreover, as our interest is in the dynamics of support for Leave among the different 
profiles, we included quarter of interview in the model and introduced an interaction term 
between the political profiles and quarter of interview. 
 
The results of our baseline model (i.e. with only the political profiles, quarter of interview and 
the interaction between the two as predictors of the EU referendum outcome) are for simplicity 
reported as a graph of the adjusted predictions (Figure 10). The same has been done for the full 
model (i.e. the model including the socio-demographic characteristics) (Figure 11).1 We only 
report the results for the first quarters of 2016 and 2017. We did so because we wanted to leave 
ample time between the pre- and the post-referendum respondents, i.e. enough time for the two 
periods of data collection to be distinct. The beginning of 2017 showed the first signs of the 
British economy performing less well than those of the Eurozone countries, while the opposite 













                                           
1 The full results of these models (as tables with regression coefficients) can be obtained from 
the authors upon request. 
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Figure 10. Adjusted predictions for the baseline model with latent profiles, quarter of 
interview and their interaction (DK = Don’t know) 
 
 
Figure 11. Predictive margins for the final model with latent profiles, quarter of interview 
and their interaction (DK = Don’t know) 
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Figure 10 shows that the only type of voter profile that records a significant increase in support 
for Leave from the 1st quarter in 2016 to the 1st quarter in 2017 is the highly engaged and 
satisfied group. This group also has the highest level of political efficacy and forms the main 
support base for the two major parties. Possibly, the engaged character of this group meant that 
it has been more susceptible to messages from the Leave campaign and to the response of the 
mainstream political parties after the referendum result than the other profiles. In other words, 
this group may have been more inclined to adjust their views on UK’s membership of the EU 
to the changing political realities than other groups. Perhaps they were more influenced by the 
ambiguous messages from the two major parties regarding issues such as freedom of movement 
and welfare distribution and were therefore more prone to change their views than voters with 
other profiles. Yet, this is not more than a conjecture. Panel data combining repeated items on 
Britain’s membership of the EU with questions tapping motivations for changing preferences 
could provide more definitive answers. We also remind the reader that whenever we draw 
conclusions about changes we refer to changes in the aggregate, not changes within individuals. 
Figure 11 confirms the results obtained for the baseline model. However we notice here that 
the addition of the socio-demographic variables reduce the rate of change in support for Leave 
between the 1st quarter 2016 and the 1st quarter 2017 for the Highly engaged voters, confirming 
the importance of socio-demographic characteristics for the EU membership outcome. Support 
for leave amongst this group remains significantly higher in the first quarter of 2017 by 
comparison to the first quarter of 2016. Thus this group remains the only group showing a 
significant increase in support for Brexit. 
 
We further see that the number of undecided people (i.e. the don’t knows) has gone down 
significantly for three of the four profiles between early 2016 and early 2017. Probably, this 
declining share of ambivalent voters is due to the growing salience of the issue of Britain’s 
membership of the EU over the course of 2016. In a context where not a day goes by that this 
issue is not discussed in the media it is likely that people become engaged with the topic and 
make up their minds about it. 
 
Interestingly, the only group not showing a significant decline in the number undecided voters 
is the highly engaged group. As this group did show a marked increase in support for leave, 




A key finding of this paper is that support for UK’s departure from the EU is not stable. From 
the first quarter of 2016 to that of 2017 the preference for leave first increased and then 
declined. This trend was also visible among subgroups of the population, such as young and 
old, rich and poor, and men and women, notwithstanding the sometimes marked differences in 
levels of support for leave between these groups. The common trends among the subgroups 
suggest that no one was immune to the wider the socio-political context. All people, whatever 
their socio-demographic profile, seem to have been influenced regarding their preference for 
leave or remain by the political events of 2016 and their coverage by the media. The only 
exception to this pattern are the very poorly and very highly educated, as the opinions of these 
groups were remarkably stable. Since these groups also showed such a pronounced preference 
for either remain (the highly educated) or leave (the poorly educated), it would appear that the 
more decided a particular group is in its views on Brexit the less likely it is to change its views 
in response to external events and circumstances. This finding chimes with other research 
showing that groups with firm beliefs or extreme views are unaffected by educational 
experiences or facts challenging their points of view (Gaine 2000; Preston et al 2005; Nyhan 
and Reifler 2010). 
 
Yet, these two groups with their pronounced views on Brexit should not distract us from the 
finding that the views of the vast majority of people were malleable. Indeed, regression analysis 
showed that the increase in support for leave over the aforementioned period was significant 
controlling for a range of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. In other words, this 
growth was genuine and did not reflect changes in the social composition of the sample 
collected over this period. This analysis also revealed that national identity (as measured with 
a question on the importance of being British) became a more important predictor of the 
preference for leave during 2016. In view of the changeable nature of the views on Brexit, one 
could indeed question the wisdom of basing such an important decision as leaving the EU on 
a single poll. ‘The will of the people’ might be more accurately captured by holding the 
referendum multiple times over the course of several years and by averaging the result of these 
plebiscites.  
 
Our research further identified four groups of respondents with distinct political profiles. We 
labelled these groups ‘the trusting voters’, ‘the highly engaged and satisfied’, ‘the non-
 30 
engaged’ and ‘the dissatisfied voters’. Interestingly, the only group showing a significant rise 
in the preference for leave was the highly engaged and satisfied, who also happen to be the 
largest of the four. In terms of the perspectives on voter volatility discussed in the review of 
the literature, this finding unequivocally supports the theory that changing political positions 
are a feature of the engaged, informed and well-educated citizen responding rationally to the 
changing socio-political context. They are also quite compatible with the aforementioned 
valence theory of Butler and Stokes’ (1969), which holds that voters change their party of 
choice if they feel the government is falling short of delivering on objectives for which there 
is broad popular support. They do so because valence theory assumes voters to be informed 
and willing to invest time in monitoring and evaluating the government. As it is primarily the 
engaged and satisfied who display the greatest flexibility, a group moreover that is larger than 
any other group, one could quite plausibly predict that many people are likely to change their 
opinion back to remain if they are confronted with circumstances suggesting that Brexit brings 
more costs than benefits. 
 
What caused these dynamics in support for leave? Our findings provisionally suggest that 
changing positions of the mainstream political parties and positive economic developments are 
the prime drivers. After the referendum Labour and the Conservatives, who officially supported 
remain in the run-up to the poll, quickly embraced the result of the referendum and stated they 
would lead the UK out of the EU in an orderly manner. The highly engaged and satisfied, who 
also happen to form the backbone of these parties, may well have responded to this changing 
position and the new political reality post-referendum by bringing their views in line with their 
parties’ standpoints. Their increasing inclination towards leave may have been further propped 
up by the sound performance of the economy in the second half of 2016, as this gave the 
impression that Britain would not be affected by the departure from the EU in terms of 
economic prosperity. Our results do not suggest that radical voices on the fringes of the political 
spectrum and expressed through the social media are responsible for the change, because the 
group showing rising support for leave is unlikely to have been susceptible to such voices.  
 
Yet, these provisional conclusions are mere conjectures. As noted before, the data only allow 
us to make statements about changes in the aggregate for different groups, not about changing 




We have to end on a rather disconcerting note. We found clear evidence of growing 
polarization among the electorate regarding views on Britain’s membership of the EU as the 
percentage of undecided people (‘don’t knows’) contracted in all four political groups. This 
polarization appeared to happen along social lines as we found people with lower than average 
levels of education to be increasingly drawn towards the leave side while those with higher 
than average levels of education displayed a growing preference for remain. It may well be the 
case that the continued salience of the issue in the media has pushed people to make up their 
minds about Britain’s membership of the EU and/or cling ever more tenaciously to their 
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Appendix 1:  A List of variables used in the analysis  
Label used in the text Original variable’s response categories 
Should UK remain member of EU, w8 
Leave EU, Remain in EU (Don't know/refusal = 
missing) 
Should UK remain member of EU, w8 
Leave EU, Remain in EU, Don’t know 
(Refusal=missing) 
Age and sex, w8  
Quarter of interview, w8  
Highest qualification, w8 
Other/No qualification, GCSE, A-level, Other 
degree, Degree 
Satisfaction with income, w8 
from Completely dissatisfied (1) To Completely 
Satisfied (7) 
Level of interest in politics, w7 from Very (4) to Not at all (1) 
Gross household income 
w6 personal data using w8 household structure 
(in 500£ increments) 
Economic Status, w8 
Employed, Not employed, Retired, Looking 
after family, Student 
Marital status, w8 Single, Married, Divorced, Widowed 
Importance of being British, w6 
from  Not at all important (0) to Extremely 
important (10) 
Qualified to participate in politics, w6 from Strongly agree (5) to Strongly disagree (1) 
Public officials do not care, w6 from Strongly agree (5) to Strongly disagree (1) 
Do not have a say on what govt does, w6 from Strongly agree (5) to Strongly disagree (1) 
Satisfaction with democracy in own country, w6 Very satisfied (4) to Very dissatisfied (1) 
Importance of being British, w6, for LCA Low = 0 to 5; High = 6 to 10 
Strength of Party support, w6, for LCA Very and Fairly = 1 to 2; Not very = 3 
Interest in politics, w6, for LCA Very and some = 1 to 2; Little and None = 3 to 4 
Political efficacy, w6, for LCA Low = 2 to 3; High = 4; Missing = 1 
Don’t know Political efficacy, w6, for LCA 
Known political efficacy = 2 to 4; Does not 
know = 1 
Voting is a civic duty, w6, for LCA Disagree = 4 to 5; Agree = 1 to 2; Missing = 3 
Don’t know if voting is a civic duty, w6, LCA 
Knows if voting is civic duty = 1, 2, 4, 5; Does 
not know = 3 
Costs of political engagement, w6, LCA Costly = 1 to 2; Not costly = 4 to 5; Missing =3 
Don’t know costs of political engagement Knows costs = 1, 2, 4, 5; Does not know = 3 
Intention to vote at next GE, w6, for LCA Low = 0 to 5; High = 6 to 10 
Satisfaction with democracy, w6, for LCA Satisfied = 1 to 2; Dissatisfied = 3 to 4 
Don’t know if satisfied with democracy, LCA Known satisfaction = 1 to 4; Does not know = 5 
Feels qualified for politics w6, for LCA Agree = 1 to 2; Disagree = 3 to 4 
Don’t know if qualified for politics w6, for LCA Known = 1 to 4; Does not know = 5 
Feels better informed in politics than average w6, for 
LCA 
Agree = 1 to 2; Disagree = 3 to 4 
Don’t know if better informed than average w6, for LCA Known = 1 to 4; Does not know = 5 
Feels that public officials care w6, for LCA Agree = 1 to 2; Disagree = 3 to 4 
Don’t know if public officials care w6, for LCA Known = 1 to 4; Does not know = 5 
Feels that has a say in politics w6, for LCA Agree = 1 to 2; Disagree = 3 to 4 
Don’t know if has a say in politics w6, for LCA Known = 1 to 4; Does not know = 5 
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Appendix 2: Determinants of the preference for leaving the EU (main effects and interactions)  
Logit models of determinants of 
support for leaving EU (log odds) 












































Should UK leave the EU          
Ref.: First quarter 2016          
          
Second quarter 2016 0.134 0.204 -0.070 -0.056 -0.557** 0.060 -0.024 -0.121 0.022 
 (0.261) (0.169) (0.264) (0.210) (0.213) (0.208) (0.252) (0.224) (0.280) 
Third quarter 2016 0.170 0.187 -0.252 0.355~ -0.322 0.006 0.030 0.194 0.446~ 
 (0.254) (0.165) (0.253) (0.205) (0.207) (0.204) (0.246) (0.215) (0.263) 
Fourth quarter 2016 0.091 0.271 -0.362 0.069 -0.031 0.222 0.573* 0.181 0.854** 
 (0.275) (0.177) (0.272) (0.223) (0.221) (0.221) (0.250) (0.236) (0.287) 
First quarter 2017 0.173 0.289 0.265 0.402 -0.377 0.429 0.366 0.636* 0.374 
 (0.351) (0.235) (0.375) (0.294) (0.303) (0.302) (0.361) (0.323) (0.373) 
Age  0.005 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.320*** -0.320*** -0.316*** -0.320*** -0.317*** -0.318*** -0.315*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Ref.: Single          
          
Married 0.256** 0.255** 0.255** 0.253** 0.253** 0.255** 0.255** 0.256** 0.253** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Divorced 0.316** 0.315** 0.316** 0.317** 0.316** 0.317** 0.320** 0.318** 0.317** 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) 
Widowed -0.125 -0.121 -0.126 -0.125 -0.121 -0.119 -0.116 -0.118 -0.121 
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 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Ref.: Employed          
          
Not employed -0.076 -0.077 -0.079 -0.082 -0.088 -0.080 -0.076 -0.076 -0.085 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) 
Retired 0.038 0.040 0.033 0.038 0.047 0.039 0.042 0.042 0.035 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Looking after family 0.221 0.220 0.216 0.217 0.217 0.216 0.216 0.224 0.213 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) 
Student -0.285 -0.278 -0.274 -0.275 -0.268 -0.277 -0.279 -0.276 -0.271 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.187) (0.188) (0.187) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187) 
Household income -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Satisfaction with income -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.126** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Highest qualification (UKHLS & 
BHPS) 
-0.235*** -0.220*** -0.236*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.235*** 
 (0.019) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Importance of being British 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.072*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Level of interest in politics -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.121* -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.117*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.061) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Qualified to participate in politics -0.081** -0.081** -0.083** -0.082** -0.080** -0.096~ -0.082** -0.080** -0.081** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Do not have a say on what govt 
does 
0.130*** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.136* 0.132*** 0.129*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.057) (0.031) (0.031) 
Satisfaction with democracy in 
own country 
-0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.180** -0.167*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.070) (0.032) 
Public officials do not care 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.185*** 0.244*** 
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 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.063) 
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # Age          
          
Second quarter 2016 # Age  -0.001         
 (0.004)         
Third quarter 2016 # Age  -0.000         
 (0.004)         
Fourth quarter 2016 # Age  0.003         
 (0.005)         
First quarter 2017 # Age  0.000         
 (0.006)         
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # Highest 
qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # Highest 
qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) 
 -0.041        
  (0.051)        
Third quarter 2016 # Highest 
qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) 
 -0.006        
  (0.049)        
Fourth quarter 2016 # Highest 
qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) 
 -0.003        
  (0.053)        
First quarter 2017 # Highest 
qualification (UKHLS & BHPS) 
 -0.036        
  (0.071)        
Ref. : First quarter 2016 # 
Satisfaction with income 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # 
Satisfaction with income 
  0.032       
   (0.050)       
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Third quarter 2016 # Satisfaction 
with income 
  0.087~       
   (0.048)       
Fourth quarter 2016 # Satisfaction 
with income 
  0.129*       
   (0.052)       
First quarter 2017 # Satisfaction 
with income 
  -0.015       
   (0.072)       
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # Level of 
interest in politics 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # Level of 
interest in politics 
   0.056      
    (0.080)      
Third quarter 2016 # Level of 
interest in politics 
   -0.078      
    (0.078)      
Fourth quarter 2016 # Level of 
interest in politics 
   0.080      
    (0.084)      
First quarter 2017 # Level of 
interest in politics 
   -0.095      
    (0.112)      
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # 
Importance of being British 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # 
Importance of being British 
    0.087**     
     (0.027)     
Third quarter 2016 # Importance 
of being British 
    0.067**     
     (0.026)     
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Fourth quarter 2016 # Importance 
of being British 
    0.040     
     (0.028)     
First quarter 2017 # Importance of 
being British 
    0.077*     
     (0.038)     
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # 
Qualified to participate in politics 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # Qualified 
to participate in politics 
     0.008    
      (0.068)    
Third quarter 2016 # Qualified to 
participate in politics 
     0.058    
      (0.066)    
Fourth quarter 2016 # Qualified to 
participate in politics 
     0.015    
      (0.071)    
First quarter 2017 # Qualified to 
participate in politics 
     -0.083    
      (0.097)    
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # Do not 
have a say on what govt does 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # Do not 
have a say on what govt does 
      0.032   
       (0.072)   
Third quarter 2016 # Do not have 
a say on what govt does 
      0.041   
       (0.070)   
Fourth quarter 2016 # Do not 
have a say on what govt does 
      -0.094   
       (0.072)   
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First quarter 2017 # Do not have a 
say on what govt does 
      -0.054   
       (0.103)   
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # 
Satisfaction with democracy in 
own country 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # 
Satisfaction with democracy in 
own country 
       0.085  
        (0.090)  
Third quarter 2016 # Satisfaction 
with democracy in own country 
       -0.011  
        (0.087)  
Fourth quarter 2016 # Satisfaction 
with democracy in own country 
       0.036  
        (0.096)  
First quarter 2017 # Satisfaction 
with democracy in own country 
       -0.193  
        (0.131)  
Ref.: First quarter 2016 # Public 
officials do not care 
         
          
Second quarter 2016 # Public 
officials do not care 
        0.018 
         (0.079) 
Third quarter 2016 # Public 
officials do not care 
        -0.081 
         (0.075) 
Fourth quarter 2016 # Public 
officials do not care 
        -0.175* 
         (0.082) 
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First quarter 2017 # Public 
officials do not care 
        -0.055 
         (0.107) 
Constant -0.232 -0.306 0.026 -0.250 0.142 -0.209 -0.271 -0.237 -0.468 
 (0.304) (0.274) (0.307) (0.282) (0.285) (0.285) (0.301) (0.290) (0.309) 
Observations 10896 10896 10896 10896 10896 10896 10896 10896 10896 
Standard errors in parentheses          
~ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  
*** p<0.001 
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